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Muslim Faith Movements (Tahrīk-e Īmān) from South-Asia have proven specific strengths in 
influencing and re-shaping the Islamic-Religious Fields in the Diaspora communities in 
European countries as well as in their societies of origin in South Asia. The Tablīghī Jamā´at 
emerged 1926 as a Muslim response to the shuddhī-campaign of the Hindu missionary 
movement Ārya Samāj. Its founder, the charismatic Dĕobandī trained ´ālim Maulānā 
Muhammad Ilyās Kāndhalawī (1885-1944), developed a six point (che bātein) programme,2 
that still serves as the principal guideline for all lay preachers. His nephew Maulānā 
Muhammad Zakarīyā Kāndhalawī (1898-1982) wrote the handbooks of the movement, 
commentaries on selected ahadīth (1940), collectively published as Tablīghī Niàāb (Urdū: 
Tablīghī Curriculum, 1955), which since 1985 is also called Fazā’il-e A‛māl (II Vols.) (Urdū: 
Virtuous of Good Deeds). Maulānā Muhammad Yūsuf (1917-1965), the son of Maulānā Ilyās, 
and amīr of Tablīghī Jamā´at after his father´s death in 1944, wrote the second major 
publication of the movement, “Hayāt as-Sahābah” (III Vols.) (Arabic: The Lives of the 
Sahābah, the founder generation of Islam). After Maulānā Yūsuf´s death in 1965, Maulānā 
In´āmul Hasan led the movement until 1995. Since then the movement has a collective 
membership (Urdū: shūrā) dominated meanwhile by Maulānā Sa´d (b. 1965) and Zubair (b. 
1950). Since the late 1960s the movement operates globally, with their European headquarters 
in Dewsbury (UK, founded in 1978),3 the North-American headquarters in Chicago4 and its 
world headquarters next to the Nizāmuddīn shrine in New Delhi. Members are popularly 
                                                 
1
 A lot of the material used in this paper is drawn from interviews conducted during fieldwork in Pakistan 
(November 2006), Spain (November 2007), and India (January-April 2008) for the collaborative research project 
“Muslims in Europe and Their Societies of Origin in Asia and Africa”, funded by the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research under the Grant Programme “Humanities in Dialogue with Society.” 
For summaries and impressions of the fieldwork, see: 
Da´wat-e Islami in Pakistan: http://www.zmo.de/muslime_in_europa/ergebnisse/gugler/index_en.html  
Da´wat-e Islami in Spain: http://www.zmo.de/muslime_in_europa/ergebnisse/gugler/index-spain2.htm  
Da´wat-e Islami in India: http://picasaweb.google.de/thomas.gugler . 
2
 Shahādah, zalāt, dhikr, ikrām-e Muslim, niyyāt, and nafr. 
3
 Other major Tablighi Centres in Europe are: Association Foi et Pratique in Paris founded in 1972 (first jamā´at 
in 1962), An-Nur Mosque in Brussels 1975, Asociacion Annur Mezquita in Barcelona registered 1992 (founded 
1985), and Friedrichsdorf Mosque Association in Germany in 2000. 
4
 The annual ijtemā´ in Chicago 1988 is said to have been the largest Muslim gathering in North-America until 
then. See: Ahmad, Mumtaz: Islamic Fundamentalisms in South Asia: The Jamaat-i Islami and the Tablighi 
Jama´at. In: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Eds.): Fundamentalisms Observed. Chicago: University of 
Chicago 1991, pp. 457-530. 
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recognised by the white shalwār-qamiz, a fist-long beard, miswāk, black leather socks and 
sometimes prayer-marks on the forehead – the black leather socks (Dĕobandī khufein) being 
the differentia specifica. Its dynamics of conversion and mobilization rely heavily on Gujarati 
trader networks.5 
 
Da´wat-e Isāmī: The Barelwī response to the transnational missionary efforts of Deoband? 
 
In 1981 the “Amīr-e Ahl-e Sunnat”(1982) and Memon Maulānā Muhammad Ilyās Qādrī 
´Attār (b. 1950) officially founded the Barelwī version of the Tablīghī Jamā´at, the Da´wat-e 
Islāmī (www.dawateislami.net), in Karachi. While Da´wat-e Islāmī copies the structure and 
activities of Tablīghī Jamā´at, their members differ from them in appearance mainly because 
of their green turban. The green colour of the turban, indicating their focus on the green dome 
of the Prophet in Madīna (Masjid an-Nabawī), is regarded as their trade mark, the central 
element in their politics of visibility, and has led to their popular label “jannat ke tūte”, 
parrots of paradise. The six points of action of the Tablīghī Jamā´at (che bātein) are worked 
out into 72 directives, the Madīna-rewards (madanī in´amat), which serve as guidelines to 
evaluate the daily performance in the madanī card, which has to be forwarded to one´s 
negrān (Urdū: in-charge) once a month. This madanī card is also a tool for formalizing the 
murīd´s (disciple) relation to the murshid (master), as the monthly points collected according 
to the 72 rewards  indicate the pīr´s love for the adherent (dost – friend of ´Attār, pyārā – the 
cherished one of ´Attār, mehbūb – dear to ´Attār´s heart, or manzūr-e nazar – favourite of 
´Attār). ´Attāri´s handbook of the Sunnas resembles the main book of the Tablīghī Jamā´at, 
“Fazā’il-e A‛māl”, and is entitled “Faizān-e Sunnat” (Urdū: Spiritual Benefits of the Sunnah). 
Comparable to the Tablīghī Jamā´at, Da´wat-e Islāmī organises besides the weekly ijtemā´ a 
three-day annual congregation in Multan for South Asia and Birmingham for Europe. The 
highlight of the weekly ijtemā´ is the Fiqr-e Madīna, the visualization of the Judgement Day 
and honest repentance of sins. 
 
 
Liminal spaces between Du´a and Fiqr-e Madina at the annual ijtema´ in Multan. Copyright: Thomas K. 
Gugler 
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 Cf. Lewis, Philip: Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics, and Identity among British Muslims. London: I. B. Tauris 
1994, pp. 90-94. See also the paper by Hansen, Thomas Blom: “We are Arabs from Gujarat” the purification of 
Muslim identity in contemporary South Africa. Seminar 2003/2, RAU Sociology. 
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The movement operates globally from its world headquarters Faizān-e Madīna in Karachi and 
all followers are requested to take bay´a, oath of allegiance, to Ilyās Qādrī ´Attār. The North-
American headquarters is in Chicago,6 the European headquarters is the Faizān-e Madīna in 
Accrington, UK. Other centres of the same name can be found in Bradford, Birmingham, 
Barcelona, Valencia and Malaga. Members of the Da´wat-e Islāmī imitate the symbols of 
piety introduced by the Tablīghīs into the religious market,7 especially the prayer-marks on 
the fore-head. They also stress the length of the beard and the uniform dress code, which is a 
white shalwār-qamiz, with miswāk and a green beard-comb in its pocket, a green turban 
(´imāma-sharīf), and a brown madanī cādar. The Da´wat-e Islāmī has an edge over the 
Tablīghī Jamā´at as it since 1990 runs its own chain of Madrasas, Madrassa-tul-Madīna, with 
more than 1,000 Madrasas in Pakistan alone.8   
 
 
Madrassa-tul-Madīna in Mumbai, March 2008, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
Indian exceptionalism: Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī kā maqbûl-e ´ilm-e Tablīghī Nisāb 
 
In 1992, allegedly after a dispute with the Pakistani Organization Committee on issues 
connected to the first annual Da´wat-e Islāmī ijtemā´ in India in 1991, the negrān (Urdū: care-
taker) of the Indian branch of Da´wat-e Islāmī, Maulānā Muhammad Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī, also a 
Memon, split off to form the independent movement Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī 
(www.sunnidawateislami.net), which has its world headquarters in Mumbai in the Ismā´īl 
Habīb Masjid at Muhammad Ali Rd., where Da´wat-e Islāmī´s first weekly ijtemā´s in India 
were held from 1988 onwards. As in Sunnī Youth Federation or in Sunnī Tahrīk,9 another 
offspring of the Da´wat-e Islāmī, Sunnī here marks the claim to be connected to the Ahl-e 
Sunnat wa´l Jamā´at (Barelwī) school of thought. Followers of the Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī 
differ from followers of the Da´wat-e Islāmī in appearance because of their white turban. As 
several Indian Barelwī ´ulamā´ suspected Ilyās ´Attār to be a secret agent of the Tablīghī 
Jamā´at, they hesitated to support him when Madanī work began in Mumbai in 1988, 
propagating that several Da´wat-e Islāmī activities – for example keeping Muslims after 
prayer at the mosque to listen to dars, separate families by sending the men around on travel-
                                                 
6
 http://www.faizanemadina.us .  
7
 For the transformation processes through the market situation see: Finke, Roger and Rodney Stark: The 
Churching of America, 1776-2005. Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University 2005. 
8
 http://madrassa.faizaneattar.net . For a discussion see: International Crisis Group: Pakistan: Karachi´s Madrasas 
and violent Extremism. Brussels: Asia Report N° 190 – 29 March 2007. 
9
 http://Sunnitehreek.com.pk . 
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tours etc. - 10 would not be Barelwī, but Dĕobandī bidat, innovation.11 SDI´s darsī kitāb is a 
commentary on selected ahadīth, too. Resembling Ilyās ´Attārs “Faizān-e Sunnat” it was first 
called “Faizān-e Sharī´at”12 (Urdū: Spiritual Benefit of the Sharī´ah, 1999 written by 
Maulānā Muhammad Ibrāhīm Āshi) with the subtitle explaining it to be the Barelwī Tablīghī 
Nisāb, but meanwhile officially renamed “Barakāt-e Sharī´at” (Urdū: Blessings of the 
Sharī´at) and rewritten by Maulānā Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī. Barakāt-e Sharī´at was published in 
three parts, each part at the annual ijtemā´ in 2005, 2006, and 2007. The annual ijtemā´, which 
takes place since 1991 at the Vādi-e Nūr Azad Maidān in Mumbai, differs from the annual 
ijtemā´s of the other two movements, as the first day of the three-day-meeting, Fridays, is 
reserved for the sisters. The highlight of the weekly ijtemā´ is the Zikr-e Madīna, the call to 
the Beloved Prophet to save one from the tortures of hells and honest repenting of sins. 
Besides the weekly and annual ijtemā´ on Saturday nights in their headquarters, the Ismā´īl 
Habīb Masjid in Mumbai, the movement has an (weekly and) annual ijtemā´ in May in its 
European headquarters, Noor Hall, in Preston, UK. Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī organizes regular 
Youth Camps in Manchester at the North Manchester Jāmia Mosque. Other centres are in 
Blackburn (Razā Masjid), Bolton (Madīna Masjid), and Leicester (`Usmānī Masjid). The 
movement is currently setting up a da´wah-oriented Youth Education Centre in Bolton. The 
headquarters for North-America is in Chicago. SDI founded twelve madaris in India so far. 
The funding is partly organized through the Ibad-ur-Rehman Trust (Manchester) and via the 
platform World Memon Organization.13 
 
khurūj fī sabil illah: „It is time to leave our families (…) for the sake of Islam“14 
 
These three movements operate similarly: Employing peer pressure and rewarding 
conformity, the Sunnah-mongers impose a strict dress code on their followers and are 
organised in extremely mobile small units of lay preachers (jamā´at, madanī qafila, qafila), 
who invite for weekly (shab-e jum´a) and annual ijtemā´s, congregations. Imitating the hijra 
towards Madīna, highly religious young men travel on missionary gasht (walks) and khurūj  
(journeys) (chillā for forty days, a grand chillā is four months) to mosques, where they eat 
and sleep during their preaching tours, and invite the local neighbourhood to join them in 
prayer (naikī kī da´wat – invitation towards good), after which they give dars, reading a 
chapter of their respective Sunnah-catechism (darsī kitāb), which codifies the movement´s 
corporate identity. They then urge people to register for missionary journeys (tashkīl). After 
returning from the missionary tour the swarm’s leader (Urdū: amīr, negrān) is expected to 
give a report (karguzārī, madanī report) on the local conditions and the results of their 
missionary activities. As cultural conflicts have become intra-civilizational in response to 
Western modernity,15 the activities of both groups aim at the “inner mission”, bringing 
Muslims back to the “real” Islam and saving them from Western lifestyles in respect of dress, 
eating, and drinking habits. 
 
                                                 
10
 Other points of criticism were that, Ilyas ´Attar used the title “Amīr-e Ahl-e Sunnat” and claimed that it is 
obligatory for Muslims to wear the green turban. 
11
 Usually Deobandis claim that Barelwis introduced plenty of bidat. Cf. Qasmi, Matloob Ahmad: What is 
Sunnat & What is Bidat. New Delhi: Adam Publishers 2008. 
12
 New Delhi: Farid Book Depot 1999 (a second edition 2006). This book is a meanwhile officially denied link 
to the Faizān-e Sunnat, which Shakir Ali Nuri does not cite – while Barkat-e Shari´at is cited by Ilyas ´Attar. The 
subtitle reads: “Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī kā maqbûl-e ´ilm-e Tablīghī Nisāb.” 
13
 For the WMO see its official homepage: http://www.worldmemon.org . 
14
 SMS from Kafil Ahmad to his brother Sabil Ahmad, Glasgow, June 2007. Both were heavily involved in 
Tablīghī activities. 
15
 For some reflections on Islam´s interaction with modernity see: Almond, Ian: The New Orientalists. 
Postmodern Representation of Islam from Foucault to Baudrillard. London: I. B. Tauris 2007. 
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Advertising Qafilas in the Faizan-e Madina Bradford. The madrassah pult below is used to register the 
names. Copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
 
Personalizing Sunnas: “ISLAM means I Submit to the Law of Allah and Muhammad” 
 
The three movements stress piety of action as well as the strict and literal imitation of the life 
of the Prophet (sunnat an-nabī) in all aspects of the daily routine. As missionary, dā´i, the lay 
preacher has to act like a perfect, ideal Muslim, a Super-Muslim, so to speak. Selling Sunnas 
as salvation goods,16 the lay preachers are at the same time promoters and consumers of the 
commodities they promote. The commodity they are prompted to put on the market, promote 
and sell are themselves. As the three missionary movements compete for impact, politics of 
visibility is of the essence for them. The test they need to pass in order to be admitted to the 
social prizes they covet demands them to recast themselves as commodities, as products 
capable of catching the attention and attracting demand and customers (Baumann 2007: 6). 
With the interpretation of Sunnah as a normative system of life-styles (Weber / Troeltsch) the 
Missionary Movements transform the consumer into a commodity. They mark their lay 
preachers with easy recognizable symbols and marks of belonging, which exemplify modern 
processes of transformation in systems of religious practice (Graf 2003) with the means of 
Identity Formation (Eisen 1998). This process I want to call Sunnaization.17 
 
                                                 
16
 Cf.: Moore, Robert Laurence: Selling God. American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture. New York: 
Oxford University Press 1994. Cf. also: Shields, Rob (Ed.): Lifestyle Shopping. The Subject of Consumption. 
London: Routledge 1992. 
17
 Not to be confused with the concept of Sunnification as defined by Burton Benedict in his work Mauritius – 
The Problems of a Plural Society (London: Pall Mall Press 1965), p. 39: “Sunnification means the abandonment 
of local and sectarian practices in favour of a uniform orthodox practice.”  
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Haftawa Ijtemā`by Da´wat-e Islāmī in Bengaluru, in March 2008, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
 
Rediscovering Roots: From Radicalization to Spirituality 
 
The “Islamic Project”, the virtual direct of change in society, of these three movements is the 
“Sunnaization”, that is the re-shaping and re-construction of the daily routine and the 
individual markers of identity based on the examples of the Prophet and the Salaf, the pious 
ancestors, as portrayed in the Hadīth-Literature. This so-called “non-political” Sunnaization 
can be understood as the privatization or individualization of political re-Islamization.18 It 
focuses the private sphere instead of the state and argues with ahadīth rather than the Qur´ān. 
Each of the three movements produced its specific commentary on selected hadith Fazā’il-e 
A‛māl, Faizān-e Sunnat or Barakāt-e Sharī´at, focussing on the Sunna of the Prophet, sunnat 
an- nabī. The Barelwī lay preachers have yet no publication on the Sunna of the Salaf, sunnat 
as-salaf, which would be comparable to the Hayāt as-Sahābah. This different focus of 
Sunnah-values, either more sunnat an-nabī or more sunnat as-salaf, seems to become central, 
if one looks at the emotional outcome of the Sunnaization processes: when Tablīghīs develop 
through Salafī-focused Sunnaization their specific sense of disgust with the world and 
symbols of the super-Muslim serve as a signifyer that one is about to qualify for paradise and 
one has put one foot already out of the mundane “prison”, comparable processes of 
Sunnaization inside Da´wat-e Islāmī seem to serve to develop a strong emotion of love for the 
Prophet and the symbols of the super-Muslim re-inforce and express the feeling that one´s 
love for the Prophet exceeds any other emotion one may also have. 
Contentwise these Sunnah-catechisms teach an analytically comparable very specific Islamic 
etiquette in drinking, eating, walking, greeting, sleeping, brushing teeth, combing the beard, 
etc. “Sunnaization” is a process to encourage people to establish the “Sunnas of the Prophet”, 
which means that every individual establishes deep, unambiguous and public visible ties to 
the Prophet in his personal daily worlds of living. It also means to regulate one’s behaviour by 
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 Cf. Roy, Olivier: Globalised Islam. The Search for a New Ummah. New Delhi: Rupa 2005. 
Cf. Roy, Olivier: Secularism Confronts Islam. New York Chichester: Columbia University 2007. 
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either substituting norms of behaviour (for example cutting instead of shaving a beard) or 
integrating additional essentializing parts into an otherwise unchanged behaviour, for example 
doing zikr (active remembrance of God by a specific mantra) while taking the step to board a 
bus with the right foot first.  
This re-essentialized Sunnah becomes a normative system of life-styles, apparently emanating 
the power of transsubstantiation to convert a competition-ridden society of egomaniac 
consumerists into a supportive community of loving brothers and sister following either 
Muhammad or his companions. 
 
“I have never seen such long beards and such dark spots on the foreheads”19 
 
The focus however, is the stage-managing of the lay preachers´ imitation of the Prophet in the 
public sphere (cf. Jonker 2006), their symbols of piety, claiming capital of authenticity (cf. 
van der Veer 2006) to fuel the dynamics of conversions. Equipped with the symbols of the 
Super-Muslim, “all the paraphernalia to win over the hearts of the people”,20  the lay-preacher 
has to serve as a role-model for the “religious” Muslim. Neatly dressed-up followers and a 
demonstrative culture of cleanliness and discipline are central elements of re-essentialized 
religious symbol systems. As agents of “hard religion” the lay-preachers of Da´wat-e Islāmī 
compete with Tablīghīs in an aggressive rat-race for supplying salvation goods and services. 
As the lay preachers also compete with modern and secular recreational activities the 
modernization of religious rituals include active marketing measures like the staging of 
religious mass-events (annual ijtemā´s) with regional TV and sport-stars.  
 
 
Faisal Iqbal and Imran Farhat two cricket players from the National Team at the annual ijtemā´ of 
Da´wat-e Islāmī in Multan, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
The lay preachers support the in by capitalism transformed modern societies visible trend 
towards consumer-autonomy and individualization of religious participation and created 
programmes for expressive individualism and religious event culture – religion as an 
experience-factory. The customer-oriented approach allows the Sunnah-companies not just to 
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 Arshad ul-Qadri describing the Tablighi Jama´at in: Tableeghi Jamaat. Mumbai: Sunni Youth Federation 
2000, p. 17. 
20
 Arshad ul-Qadri describing the Tablighi Jama´at in: Tableeghi Jamaat. Mumbai: Sunni Youth Federation 
2000, p. 14. 
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propagate more salvation-certitude, but also to generate more need for salvation. Because of 
the bay´a the Da´wat-e Islāmī has again an edge over the Tablīghīs if it comes to securing 
customer loyalty. As a youth-movement especially the Da´wat-e Islāmī systematically focuses 
on new consumer groups, who tend to be secondarily in traditional Islamic religious fields, 
which are usually dominated by male elders. The imitatio Muhammadi is not just a means to 
generate sawab, but also social capitals like trust- and authenticity-capitals. The Islamic dress 
code serves in the here and now as a freedom-ticket with which young Muslims can 
autonomously generate social capital, which allow them to re-shape the Islamic religious field 
in their immediate environment. One can also talk about the Missionary Movements of health 
& wealth religions, which not just propagate an inexpensive and healthy lifestyle without 
intoxication and promiscuity, but also integrate their followers in permanent-expanding 
trader-networks, thereby creating long-term social-structural processes of middle class 
formation. 
 
mujhe āpnī aur zarī dunya ke logon kī islāh kī koshish karnī hai (slogan of Da´wat-e Islāmī) 
 
Though the Da´wat-e Islāmī was officially founded by Ilyās Attār himself, the idea, that the 
Tablīghī Jamā´at has to be confronted and fight against with its own weapons, came from the 
charismatic munazir (debater) Allama Arshād ul-Qādrī (1925 –2002). He wrote the extreme 
widely spread books Tablīghī Jamā´at (1987 – which is read as a prime reference between 
Indonesia and the Gambiah), Tablīghī Jamā´at āhādīs kī roánī me (Urdū: TJ in the light of 
hadīth), Zalzala (Urdū: Convulsion, 1998), Zer-o-Zabar (Urdū: Complete Destruction (of 
Dĕoband), written during his third imprisonment 1979), and Da´wat-e Insāf (Urdū: Call for 
Justice, 1992). After studying the Tablīghī dynamics of mobilization, Arshād ul-Qādrī 
stressed the need to set up a rival Barelwī organization. The first attempt was the World 
Islamic Mission (www.wimnet.org),21 Al-Da'wat-ul-Islamiyyat-ul-A'lamiyyah, which Arshād 
ul-Qādrī and the Karachi-based Shāh Ahmad Nûrānī (1926 - 2003) launched in Mecca in 
1972. The WIM has its head-office in Bradford (http://www.wimuk.com), in a building of a 
church which was renamed “Jamia Masjid Tabligh ul-Islam”.  
 
 
„Tabligh ul-Islam“ Masjid in Bradford, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
                                                 
21
 See also: http://www.wimmauritius.org . 
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The WIM was the first Barelwī organization, which systematically funded missionary travels 
on the global stage, setting up several educational institutions as well, among them the Islamic 
Missionary College in Bradford.22 The WIM founded the first Barelwī Madrasah in Bradford 
in 1974. 
The WIM, however, faced serious difficulties in keeping up the incoming flow of money and 
in this respect the organization can be called a failure – which Arshād tried to correct. 
 
 
 
World Islamic Mission in Bradford, copyright: Thomas K. Gugler 
 
Arshād ul-Qādrī and the Karachi-based Shāh Ahmad Nûrānī, since 1973 head of the Jam´īyat-
e ´Ulamā´-ye Pakistān (JUP), were the most prominent of the “founding figures” and early 
supporters of Da´wat-e Islāmī. Along with other Pakistani Barelwī ´ulemā´ they installed Ilyās 
Qādrī, who was the then Punjab president of Anjuman Tulaba-ye Islām, JUP´s youth wing,23 
as its amīr at Dār-ul ´ulūm Amjadia as they seeked i) someone who could mobilize the 
youngsters and ii) a Memon as the organization´s amīr, who with his connections to the 
business community could systematically break up the Gujarati trader networks on which 
Tablīghī Jamā´at economy and their mobilization of conversion and mobilization rely.24 
It is noteworthy, that the World Islamic Mission,25 whose president then was Arshād ul-Qādrī, 
did operate from Bradford, where Da´wat-e Islāmī set up its first European Headquarters. 
 
Spaces of Dialogues:Barelwīyat kā agent kaun? 
 
The early history of the Pakistani movement Da´wat-e Islāmī entering the increasingly 
pluralistic religious market in India is quite revealing in several aspects. The first madanī 
qafila from Karachi to Mumbai was organized in 1986. The muballighs set up the first 
markaz, the Ismā´īl Habīb Masjid in Mumbai in 1988. Their tablīgh activities, starting with 
waking up the Muslims from the neighbourhood to invite them to recite salāt-e fajr in jamā´at 
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 For example: Jam´ia Madina-tul-Islam in Den Hague, Dar-ul-´uloom Alimia in the USA,  
23
 Established by Former Federal Minister Mohammad Hanif Tayyab. Its centre is Islamiya University in 
Bahawalpur. Its biggest fraction supports Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani. 
24
 Interview with the grandson of Arshad al-Qādri, Khushtar Nûrāni in New Delhi in March 2008. 
25
 http://www.wimnet.org . Cf. also: http://www.wimmauritius.org ,  
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were copied from the Tablīghī Jamā´at in order to make sure that the Tablīghīs don’t win 
more ground, but made the local Barelwī ´ulamā´ suspicious, who saw the muballighs of 
Da´wat-e Islāmī as agents of a threatening force of Dĕobandization from within. 
In July 1991 Ilyās ´Attār, accompanied by a group of seventy muballighs, came to India in 
order to settle down the conflict with the local Ahl-e Sunnat ´ulamā´. On this occasion the 
Mumbai Barelwī ´ulamā´ hired the hit man and top-terrorist Salīm Talwār to get rid of the 
perceived agent of Dĕobandization of the Ahl-e Sunnat movement. When Ilyās ´Attār came 
out of the house of Maulānā Zahīr ud-Dīn, whom he tried to convince to support his 
movement, Salīm Talwār confronted him on Muhammad Ali Rd, putting his gun on Ilyās 
´Attārs´ head, requesting him only to leave India, after Ilyās ´Attār is reported to have said 
with a softening smile: “ham sirf madanī kām karte hain.” However, Salīm Talwār shot two 
of his disciples on the spot to make sure his request is understood and followed.26 
Following this incident Ilyās ´Attār left India and he did not come to the first annual ijtemā´ of 
Da´wat-e Islāmī in December 1991, but tried to cancel this first annual congregation and settle 
down the conflict with the Indian-Barelwī ´ulamā´ first. The ijtemā´ however was organized 
by zealous Indian activists under the negrān Muhammad Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī, who took the 
standpoint that the Tablīghī Jamā´at had to be confronted irrespective the support of the 
´ulamā´. After the ijtemā´ the Pakistani Organization Committee of Da´wat-e Islāmī refused 
to reimburse him for his costs and Muhammad Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī broke away to form the 
independent movement Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī. Muhammad Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī has since then 
not spoken a word with Ilyās ´Attār.27 
 
“I take every Sunnī like a crown on my head.” (Ilyās Attār on Sunnī Da´wat-e Islāmī) 
 
In Dĕoband Da´wat-e Islāmī is seen as another attempt of Barelwīs to copy the success of 
Dĕoband: “they try to imitate anything we do without understanding it, which is why they 
always fail. One cannot imitate something one doesn’t understand.”28 
 
 
Qadiriya-Sufi-Tombs at the Tablighi Markaz in Bengaluru: Sultan Shah Masjid. Copyright: Thomas K. 
Gugler 
                                                 
26
 Interview at the Chishti-Hindustan Masjid in Mumbai-Byculla in February 2008. 
27
 Interview with Shākīr ´Alī  Nūrī in Mumbai, 23th February 2008. 
28
 Interview with the first Vice-Chancellor of Dar-ul-´ulum Deoband, Prof. ´Abd-ul Khalique Madrassi in April 
2008 in Deoband. 
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Though the relation between Da´wat-e Islāmī and Tablīghī Jamā´at is one of an intense 
enmity, both portraying each other as Non-Muslims, reality fortunately offers enough space 
for a tolerance of ambiguity at many places. When I went to the Tablīghī markaz in 
Bangalore-Shivajinagar the madrassah boys showed me around and in the basement I saw the 
green turban of a Da´wat-e Islāmī follower, sitting in the first row, listening to dars. The 
Bangalore markaz is a special case as its hosts also the tombs of two Qādirīya-Sūfīs, Sultān 
Shāh Qādrī and Multān Shāh Qādrī. The amīr was apologizing for those as they did not 
manage to get the license to destroy the earlier tombs at this site. In this case it is allowed for 
Barelwīs to visit the Tablīghī mosque to do du´ā at the tombs and listen to dars. It is however 
not allowed to read namāz together with Tablīghīs as reciting namāz behind a Dĕobandī turns 
anyone into a Non-Muslim and one’s marriage becomes null and void, according to Ahl-e 
Sunnat fatawa. It is however allowed to pray after the prayer-times, alone, in the Tablīghī 
mosque. 
 
Religion is All Around29 
 
Modern societies are by definition becoming increasingly diverse and religiously pluralistic. 
Capitalist transformation of traditional communities and the global circulation of ideas by 
new media and the information technology have led to a situation in which people have had to 
find new modes of coexistence. As modernity comes with growing pressure to draw 
boundaries and formulate identities, globalization also brings a new ambiguity into Islamic 
interpretations, enabling them to integrate different Islamic identities (Graf 2007).  
Religious symbol systems are marked by highly conflicting semiotic complexities. Religious 
interpretation cultures constitute themselves only through processes of permanently updated 
actualization of passed down myths. Hadīth are selected, read and commented in different 
ways. Cultural interpretation systems will snatch away of any reified finalization, already 
because the agents in the world of religious sign systems are as a rule fictional (Gugler 
2008a). Fictional agents of actions however, refer to agents in reality never in an 
unambiguous way, but only in a mode of arbitrary selection decision marked by an abundance 
of options (Graf 2006). 
This paper uses in most parts the terminology of Religious Economics, not in the intention to 
reduce religious people to consumerists, but because due to the market situation in pluralistic 
societies the Missionary Movements of the Dĕoband and the Barelwī-school are forced to put 
the very same products and services on the religious market, though at the same time their 
emotional worlds of religious sentiment are completely different, just having in common that 
people receive enormous social and emotional support during missionary travels.  
The Barelwī-Semantics of Sunnas appear at times strange as they unlike the Sunnah-
Semantics of Tablīghī Jamā´at, merge into the Sūfī-Semantics of self-annihilation, self-
annihilation either in the murshid Ilyās Attār or the Beloved Prophet Muhammad Mustafā. 
Maybe one should quickly translate those semantics of self-annihilation in terms of an Indian 
religions inherent “Oceanic Feeling” (Masson 1980, Gugler 2008b) or “Ewigkeitsgefühl” 
[feeling of eternity] (Freud), i. e. waves of an feeling of sadness and disgust with the world 
mixing with the awareness of transience (naturally including world destruction fantasies 
usually in the form of an obsession with the Day of Judgement) and a specific nostalgia - 
feelings of a deep depersonalization mixing with cosmic narcissism (Kohut) – before 
obsessive paranoid experts of Islam-analysis start unfolding their analytical expertise. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 „Religion ist überall.“ Rössler, Dietrich: Die Vernunft der Religion. München: Piper 1976, p. 7. 
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